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ARTICLE
CITY OF CLEVELAND V. CEI:
A CASE STUDY IN ATTEMPTS TO
MONOPOLIZE BY REGULATED UTILITIES
BARRY KELLMAN*
NICHOLAS J. MARINO**
N CLEVELAND, OHIO, A LEGAL CONTROVERSY HAS DEVELOPED which
compels the judiciary to evaluate the limits of competition.' Seventy
years of head-to-head combat between a large investor-owned electric
system and a smaller city-owned company has entered the federal
courts as an issue to be resolved under section two of the Sherman Act.2
The precise issue is whether a refusal by the larger utility to sell or
wheel power to the smaller utility constitutes an illegal act of
monopolization. To resolve this issue, the judiciary must superimpose
upon a stormy political dispute3 an abstract formulation of proper and
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.A.,
University of Chicago; J.D., Yale University.
** B.A., University of Akron; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Asso-
ciate, Emershaw, Mushkat, Axner & Shumaker, in Akron, Ohio.
1 City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., No. C75-560 (N.D.
Ohio, filed July 1, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Cleveland v. CEI].
' Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade (Sherman Anti-Trust
Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1974).
' The political war between MUNY Light and CEI began upon MUNY
Light's creation by populist Mayor Thomas L. Johnson and continues today.
While the controversy over the years has produced memorable moments, two re-
cent events stand out as indicators of the magnitude and intensity of the MUNY
Light issue. First, upon receiving a judgment against MUNY Light in Federal
court, CEI began attaching City property in February of 1978 in an attempt to
collect a past debt for electricity sold to Cleveland. How Will Cleveland's Light
Bill Be Paid?, BusINESS WEEK, Mar. 13, 1978, at 30. Second, the City chose to
default on its notes rather than sell MUNY Light to CEL. The Cleveland Story:
How the Banks Foreclosed Dennis Kucinich, THE NATION, Jan. 20, 1979, at 44;
Cleveland Woes, SATURDAY REVIEW MAGAZINE, Feb. 12, 1979, at 11-12.
A congressional report on the issue as to whether there was foul play by the
Cleveland banks which foreclosed on the City in December of 1978, concluded
that "the deep animosities and political cross currents in which some bank of-
ficers become involved [rather than] pure hard-nosed credit judgments" influ-
enced their decisions as to Cleveland's default. The Washington Post, July 17,
1979, at A-1, col. 1. While the report found that political influence was a factor in
the default decision by the banks, it did not conclude that the banks acted from a
desire to assist CEI's acquisition and/or destruction of MUNY Light. While the
six banks and CEI had eight common directors, the committee did not conclude
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improper business conduct. That this type of dispute should be resolved
by such a process is a matter of some curiosity, but that is not the sub-
ject of this Article. This Article is simply a dramatization in three parts:
the plaintiff's factual case, the defendant's affirmative defense as to the
legal merits of the plaintiff's case, and a suggested analysis and resolu-
tion.4
I. PLAINTIFF'S CASE
This is a case about a necessity of life, electricity, and how that
necessity should be distributed.'
A. The Parties
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (hereinafter referred to
as CEI) is an investor-owned utility in northeast Ohio serving the entire
City of Cleveland and surrounding areas. CEI produces and distributes
over 18,159,754,000 kilowatt-hours (kwh) of electricity annually to over
700,000 residential and commercial customers and over 7,000 industrial
facilities.' Within its service area, CEI provides over 94% of all genera-
tion capacity and over 96% of all transmission facilities, wholesale sales,
that the decision as to default was unrelated to proper economic considerations
by the bankers. Although MUNY Light's sale to CEI was made a condition for
default, MUNY Light's poor financial condition could be a sound business factor
for the bankers to use in their decision as to reviewing the city's indebtedness.
See Staff of the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance, The Role of Commercial Banks in the Finances of the
City of Cleveland, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print, 1979).
The City had a special election on February 27, 1979 to decide whether
MUNY Light should be sold to CEI. The Plain Dealer, Feb. 12, 1979, at A-1, col.
1. The City of Cleveland voted to keep the municipal plant by a wide margin.
Clev. Plain Dealer, Feb. 28, 1979, at A-1, col. 5.
' In summarizing and restating both plaintiffs and defendant's arguments,
numerous decisions had to be made in matters of interpretation and phrasing.
Each party's trial briefs exceeded 200 pages, thus requiring deletion of large
quantities of material. Furthermore, a constant dilemma was posed by the desire
to restate precisely the arguments made by counsel and the need to draw sharply
into focus the legal issue at stake in this controversy. Averments of fact are based
on evidence presented at the first trial by the parties as well as supplementary
research by the authors. Within the limits of space and understanding, every ef-
fort has been made to present the position of each party as forcefully and convin-
cingly as possible.
I William B. Norris' opening statement in his closing argument to the jury
for MUNY Light, Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975),
Proceedings of Oct., 1980.
6 CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, FACTS ABOUT THE IL-
LUMINATING COMPANY (1981). See also I. MOODY, MOODY'S PUBLIC UTILITY
MANUAL 333 (1980).
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and retail sales.7 The Cleveland Municipal Electric System (hereinafter
referred to as MUNY Light), wholly owned and operated by the City of
Cleveland, transmits electricity to retail customers.8 It sells power en-
tirely within CEI's service area. While MUNY Light did at one time
generate its own power, its generating capacity is now negligible
Throughout much of Cleveland, MUNY Light and CEI compete street-
by-street and house-by-house for the same customers. 10 In only nine com-
munities in the United States is there direct competition in the retail
distribution of electricity; Cleveland is the only major city where this
situation exists."
In 1967, CEI became a member of the Central Area Power Coordina-
tion Organization (hereinafter referred to as CAPCO), a pooling group of
five privately owned utility companies in Ohio and Pennsylvania. 2 By
the terms of the agreement, the utilities work together to coordinate
electric service; by means of interconnection, CAPCO members can take
advantage of scale economies thereby reducing needless duplication of
facilities. CAPCO members do not compete with each other, and each is
the dominant electric utility within its service area.''
B. A Chronology of the Predamage Period
1. 1906-1960
CEI, in existence since 1892, operated without competition until 1906
when the City of Cleveland annexed the community of South Brooklyn's
electric generating and distribution system. 4 In 1910, Cleveland expanded
its generating capacity when it acquired the Village of Collinwood facili-
ty again through annexation." In 1914, Cleveland began operating its
7 For a full discussion of CEIs position in the relevant market, see The
Toledo Edison Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2, and 3),
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company et al. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Units 1 and 2) [hereinafter cited as CEI et al.), 5 NRC 133, 153 (1977).
8 Id. at 166.
The Plain Dealer, Feb. 12, 1979, at A-1, col. 3.
'0 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 166.
" Brief for Defendant, filed Sept. 2, 1980, at 1, City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Company, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant].
12 CAPCO was formed in September of 1967, pursuant to an agreement by
which The Toledo Edison Co., the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., The Du-
quesne Light Co., The Ohio Edison Co. and the Pennyslvania Power Co. agreed to
coordinate the generation and transmission of electricity to further their reliabili-
ty and enhance the benefits from economies of scale. CEI et al., 5 NRC at 151-53.
" CEI et al., 5 NRC at 153-54.
" Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 52-54.
15 Id
19811
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own generating facility which was interconnected with the two
previously acquired plants, thereby creating the Cleveland Municipal
Light System.'6 For the next twenty years, MUNY Light grew quickly
and made dramatic inroads into what had previously been CEI's ex-
clusive service area." By 1937, MUNY Light served a twenty-eight
square mile area in direct competition with CEI.'8 From 1937 to 1958,
MUNY Light went through its "yardstick era."'9 Instead of attempting
to expand its market, MUNY Light sought only to meet the new de-
mand of existing customers." The purported reason for this policy was
that MUNY Light should function primarily as a check on CEI's retail
electric rates.2'
In 1958, MUNY Light re-asserted competition for the retail electric
market. New plants and equipment were put in operation while MUNY
Light embarked on a bold merchandising effort to gain new customers.22
This change in posture did not go unnoticed. By 1959, Elmer Lindseth,
president of CEI, was on record as intending to eliminate MUNY Light
as a competitor.23 At this point, MUNY Light's problems in generating
sufficient power to meet demand came to the fore, and accordingly came
MUNY Light's need to interconnect with CEI or other utilities.24
2. 1960-1970
That CEI has had, since 1960, a corporate objective to eliminate
MUNY Light from the marketplace is a key element in MUNY Light's
suit. This corporate objective was to be accomplished by preventing
MUNY Light from expanding facilities, improving reliability, or having
the financial wherewithal to compete.
MUNY Light is completely surrounded by CEI's service area and
hence must have access to the benefits of parallel interconnection with
16 Id.
Id., citing E. KENEALY, THE CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL LIGHT PLANT 8-12
(1935).
Id at 56.
'9 See note 157 infra and accompanying text.
Id. at 57-60.
21 Id
Id at 58-59.
The Plain Dealer, Sept. 24, 1980, at B-i, col. 1. A CEI memo written by
Elmer L. Lindseth, former CEI board chairman and president in 1959, stated:
[Claution would have to be exercised in any efforts we might make to
hasten the financial and service decline of the Municipal Operation, and
this was so in order not to alert Municipal Management and their many
friends of the extent of the financial difficulty MUNY was getting into.
Id
24 CEI et at., 5 NRC at 167-69.
[Vol. 30:5
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other utilities in order to meet the peak demands of its customers.25 As
a general matter, interconnection is critical to the reliability of modern
electric power systems. During emergencies, equipment maintenance
periods and peak-load times, interconnected utilities can exchange elec-
tric power as required to maintain service reliability. Furthermore, in-
terconnection protects customers against the effects of an unscheduled
outage as loads will be picked up by other power sources." Because of
its uniquely insular position, MUNY Light began in the late 1950's to
consider three courses of conduct: 1) interconnect with CEI; 2) intercon-
nect with utilities other than CEI; or 3) expand generation and transmis-
sion capabilities.
At the same time, CEI recognized that private utilities across the
country had failed to acquire municipal electric companies in those in-
stances where the rates of the municipal systems were lower than the
rates charged by the private company." MUNY Light's rates in the early
1960's were lower than CEI's.28 MUNY Light, pursuant to a contract
with the City of Cleveland, provided street light service at dispropor-
tionately high rates. The excess revenues from this street light service
were used to cross-subsidize lower rates to other customers who, unlike
the City of Cleveland, could switch to CEI. 9 CEI concluded that as long
as this pattern of cross-subsidization continued, elimination or acquisi-
IId at 173. MUNY Light was not interconnected to another electric utility.
See The Plain Dealer, Sept. 24, 1980, at B-1, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 23, 1980. CEI has for a
number of years been interconnected with other electric untilites including the
Ohio Edison Co., with which CEI is in direct competition for customers along
their mutual service territories which is CEI's southern boundary.
" Fairman and Scott, Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition in the
Electric Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS L. REV. 1159, 1168-70 (1977).
7 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 166. A CEI memo from the early 1960's showed that
CEI had performed a study on the ability of private power companies to acquire
municipal systems. The study showed that when the rates of the municipal system
were less than the rates of a private utility, the continued existence of the munic-
ipal system was almost certain. In such event, the memo went on: "[I]t would be
necessary to use extreme measures to acquire the plant." The Plain Dealer, Sept.
24, 1980, at B-1, col. 1, 2; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1,
1975), proceedings of Sept. 23 1980.
28 See KENEALY, supra note 17, at 8-12.
Cross-subsidization is the process by which a firm uses financial resources
gained in one market to enhance its competitive position in a second market.
Antitrust issues may be raised if cross-subsidization is used to implement a
predatory pricing scheme, whereby a firm lowers its prices in one market to a
level below their marginal cost using profits from another market to balance
against those competitive losses. See California Computer Products, Inc. v. Int'l
Bus. Machines, 613 F.2d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 1979); III AREEDA & TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 150-54 (1978)[hereinafter cited as AREEDA & TURNER].
1981]
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tion of MUNY Light would be extremely difficult. Therefore, CEI tried
to exploit MUNY Light's need for an interconnection by opposing
MUNY Light's rate policy and its plans for plant expansion. This
strategy was first used in 1962 when CEI offered to interconnect with
MUNY Light on the two-fold condition that MUNY Light reduce its
rates charged to the city for street light service and correspondingly
raise its rates for all other service equal to CEI's rates." This proposal
was considered to be an unwarranted interference with the authority of
the elected officials of Cleveland and was rejected. 1
MUNY Light began in 1968 to explore the possibility of interconnec-
tion with the municipal plants of neighboring Painesville and Orrville.32
MUNY Light also proposed to add to its own generation and transmis-
sion facilities.33 CEI publicly opposed any such interconnection and ex-
pansion, and both proposals were subsequently abandoned.' In late 1965
1' CEI et al., 5 NRC at 167. The NRC found that CEI offered to interconnect
with MUNY Light only if MUNY Light would increase its rates to its retail
customers and decrease its charges to the city for street light service. The NRC
found CE's attempt to fix MUNY's rates to be a price fixing scheme and thereby
per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
While testifying before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mr. Lindseth
stated that CEI requested a change in MUNY Light's rates only because "CEI
[wanted] . . . to utilize the tax exemption of the Municipal Light plant for the
benefit of all the taxpayers of Cleveland instead of those who were customers of
the Municipal Light Plant." At trial, Mr. Lindseth testified that CEI feared a per-
manent interconnection would give MUNY Light the system dependability it
needed. Dependability, in conjunction with MUNY Light's lower rates, would
give MUNY Light a competitive advantage that CEI could not tolerate. The
Plain Dealer, Sept. 24, 1980, at B-1, col. 3; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D.
Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 23, 1980.
"' CEI et al., 5 NRC at 168. "Though Cleveland had 'long desired an intercon-
nection between [MELP] and CEI,' it could not accept CEI's interconnection of-
fers 'with this coercive limitation' [rate equalization] but remained interested 'in
an interconnection of the two systems in the interest of public welfare and the
mutual benefit of the two systems' and was 'willing to consider an interconnec-
tion on a business basis without unfair strings attached."' Id., citing Feb. 17,
1965, letter of then Cleveland Mayor Locher to CEI President Besse.
32 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 168.
Id. In 1962, the city had publicly proposed to add to MUNY Light's genera-
tion facilities. The proposal, which would have added a 75 megawatt (mw) boiler
and and 985 mw steam turbine generating unit, was never implemented. In 1968,
the city again publicly proposed addition to MUNY Light's plant and equipment,
and those proposals also were carried out.
Id. CEI publicly renewed its offer of a conditional interconnection each time
the city proposed to add to MUNY Light's transmission and/or generating capa-
city. The NRC found that this caused the proposed projects to fail. Further, the
NRC found such activity constituted destructive competition, given that CEI
acted from a desire to hinder MUNY Light's ability to serve its customers with
reliable power. See Brief for Plaintiff, filed Sept. 2,.1980, at 29, Cleveland v. CEI,
No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff].
The City offered into evidence CEI communications to show CEI's attempt to
[Vol. 30:5
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and into 1966, CEI adopted an aggressive promotional allowance and
free-wiring program intended to entice MUNY Light customers to
switch to CEL.3" This program was accompanied by a more entrenched
position regarding interconnection. By early 1968, CEI was no longer
willing to interconnect with MUNY Light under any conditions.
6
In the summer of 1969, MUNY Light requested that CEI provide it
with 30,000 kilowatts (kw) of standby power in order to enable MUNY
Light to install air pollution control devices in its plant. 7 CEI refused
this request but offered to provide a temporary nonsynchronous38 11 kv
modify and defeat a bond levy for MUNY Light. The CEI memo suggested that
CEI assisted in its defeat. Further evidence showed that Donald H. Hauser, CEI
general counsel, prepared an amendment to the MUNY Light legislation which
blocked the sale of the bond issues. A Cleveland City Councilman subsequently
proposed amendments to the MUNY Light levy similar to those prepared by
CEI. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 3, 1980, at A-17, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Oct. 2, 1980.
1 At trial, Theodore L. Tsevdos, President of the Pentagon Plating In-
dustries, testified that CEI offered his company $18,000 to $21,000 worth of free
wiring as an incentive to switch from MUNY Light to CEI service. Further, CEI
paid twenty-seven other contractors $707,656 to convert 1,883 commercial
customers to CEI service. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 8, 1980, at A-23, col. 1;
Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Oct.
7, 1980.
The City's expert, Mr. Weiss, testified that CEI's free wiring program con-
stituted "cut-throat" competition and was predatory in nature. Mr. Weiss also
testified that free wiring was prohibited under CEI's operating license as issued
by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 8, 1980, at
A-23, col. 1 (proceedings of Oct. 7, 1980). The NRC found CEI's free wiring pro-
gram constituted cut-throat competition. CEI et aL, 5 NRC at 166.
" Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 34, at 31. Clement T. Lashing, CEI treasurer,
testified CEI knew a decade ago MUNY Light needed an interconnection and
that CEI intentionally avoided it. A 1964 CEI memo (Bingham Memo) stated: "A
strong permanent interconnection would give (MUNY Light) the ... reliability it
sorely needs." Mr. Lashing testified that he agreed with Mr. Bingham's state-
ment and advised that CEI should not be interconnected with MUNY Light.
The Plain Dealer, Sept. 25, 1980, at A-23, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975) proceedings of Sept. 24, 1980. See CEI et
al., 5 NRC at 168-69.
, CEI et al., 5 NRC at 169.
Electricity in the form of AC current has uneven waves which when looked
at from a side view have a series of alternating high points and low points. When
two generators are producing AC current, the alternating high and low points
from one generator will not necessarily correspond to the alternating high and
low points of the other. When two generators are producing electricity which
does not have matching AC currents, the two generators are nonsynchronous. A
nonsynchronous interconnection or load transfer system, is an interconnection
between two utilities where the power which is being sent over the interconnec-
tion has AC waves which do not match the AC waves of the electricity being pro-
duced by the firm which is accepting the current.
A firm which is being supplied electricity over a nonsynchronous interconnec-
19811
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load transfer system without parallel operation.3 9 CEI made no effort to
implement the 11 kv system until after MUNY Light suffered a major
power outage during Christmas Week of 1969, leaving customers
without service for an extended period of time." Although the 11 kv
system was eventually placed into operation, it provided MUNY Light
with little help for its long-range production problems. CEI placed
heavy procedural burdens upon its use. When power was needed,
MUNY officials had to telephone CEI plant personnel who, in turn, had
to contact higher officials for their approval to furnish power. This pro-
cedure often caused hours of delay."
As a consequence of MUNY Light's inability to obtain a dependable
and immediate source of back-up power, MUNY Light suffered
numerous shortages and curtailments and consequently developed a
poor service reputation." MUNY Light's financial position simultaneously
deteriorated. CEI did not hesitate to use these developments to en-
courage MUNY Light customers to switch service. 3
tion cannot use the power which it generates to supply the same grid or distribu-
tion system; parallel operation is thereby precluded. 0. ELGERD, BASIC ELECTRIC
POWER ENGINEERING 245-94 (1977); see also A. GUILE & W. PATERSON, ELEC-
TRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 60 (2d ed. 1978); P. SPORN, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING
AND ECONOMICS 123 (1964).
CEI et al., 5 NRC at 170-71.
40 Id. at 170.
41 Id. at 169-70. The NRC found CEI's procedural delays to be far below in-
dustry standards and that they were used by CEI to knowingly strip MUNY
Light of any benefits the 11 kv load transfer system might have provided. Fur-
ther, the NRC found that CEI's offer for interconnection and final connection of
the 11 kv load transfer system came from fear that the Public Utility Commission
of Ohio would force an interconnection upon less favorable terms.
At trial, the City offered evidence that CEI employees were dispatched to watch
the smoke stacks at MUNY Light to insure that MUNY Light was using all its
generating capacity before allowing power to pass to MUNY Light over the 11
kv system. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 30, 1980, at A-17, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI,
No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 29, 1980.
42 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 173.
At trial, Sesler Titus, a MUNY Light employee, testified that CEI's outdated
11 kv transfer system caused frequent power curtailments and failures at
MUNY Light which resulted in bad publicity for MUNY Light. He added that a
permanent interconnection would have avoided these problems. The Plain
Dealer, Sept. 30, 1980, at A-17, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed
July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 29, 1980.
"3 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 166-67.
Warren D. Hinchee, MUNY Light Commissioner during early 1970's, testified
that CEI used MUNY Light's bad reputation for dependability to capture MUNY
Light customers. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 18, 1980, at A-1, col. 5; Cleveland v.
CE!, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 17, 1980.
Theodore L. Tsendos, President of Pentagon Plating Industries of Cleveland,
testified that CEI salesmen used MUNY Light's bad reputation for reliability and
[Vol. 30:5
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C. The Damage Period (1970-date)
By 1970, the option of expanding generation and transmission
facilities was no longer available to MUNY Light. Indeed, the serious
question facing MUNY Light was how to maintain existing equipment in
the face of worsening financial conditions." Only two options remained
available: purchase power from CEI, or purchase power from a more dis-
tant utility. Since MUNY Light is completely surrounded by CEI's
operating territory, either option required CEI's cooperation.
1. Interconnection with CEI
In January, 1970, CEI and MUNY Light agreed to participate in a
three-phase interconnection plan. Phases one and two related to load
transfer service with phase three contemplating the parallel intercon-
nection long sought after by MUNY Light. Almost two years later, after
CEI had refused to pursue implementation of the interconnection plan,45
MUNY Light sued CEI in a Federal Power Commission (hereinafter
referred to as FPC) proceeding seeking an emergency parallel intercon-
nection." CEI responded by filing a notice of termination of the 11 kv
load transfer system,47 but the FPC forced CEI to continue the system
poor financial situation along with newspaper clippings of MUNY outages to con-
vince him to switch to CEI power. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 8, 1980, at A-23, col. 1;
Cleveland v. CEl, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Oct.
7, 1980.
" CEI et al., 5 NRC at 173.
Irving Daniels, MUNY Light Plant Superintendent, testified that a perma-
nent interconnection with CEI would have been a "godsend." He also testified
that a permanent interconnection would have prevented financial ruin for MUNY
Light. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 30, 1980, at A-17, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 29, 1980.
,5 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 170.
The NRC found that on September 1, 1970, MUNY Light officials proposed a
meeting with CEI officials and engineers to discuss the details of establishing a
permanent interconnection between CEI and MUNY Light. No meeting occurred.
In early 1971, Mr. Hinchee, MUNY Light Commissioner, again requested a
meeting and although consenting to a meeting, CEI was totally unprepared to ef-
fectively discuss plans for permanent interconnection. At trial, Mr. Hinchee
testified that CEI had intentionally avoided meetings in an effort to delay inter-
connection. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 18, 1980, at A-1, col. 5; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 17, 1980.
The City alleged at trial that "evidence will show that notwithstanding
agreements by CEI that it would work with the city to develop a permanent
parallel interconnection, CEI employed delaying tactics to stall such construction
even though the city had done everything it was to do pursuant to its agreement
with CEI." Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 34, at 34.
" City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., Docket No. E-7631
(F.P.C., May 13, 1971).
" City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., Docket No. E-7633
(F.P.C., May 21, 1971).
19811
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in operation in order to prevent power outages and allow MUNY Light
to install air pollution control devices.48 The FPC's order provided for
the temporary interconnection approved by CEI only until such time as
MUNY Light was able to repair or replace its generating facilities.49
Furthermore, the order called for the exact limitations regarding
parallel operation which had been sought by CEI. °
A 69 kv transfer unit was subsequently constructed, but CEI blocked
its use unless all the transfer points of the existing 11 kv system were
in operation.' MUNY Light was therefore forced to combat the pro-
cedural delays of the 11 kv system. Only upon executive clearance re-
quiring twelve hour notice could MUNY Light obtain power from the 69
kv system.52 In December of 1972, MUNY Light experienced a blackout
lasting several hours. CEI attempted to manipulate this situation by
48 City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 47 FPC 747
(1972), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., City of Cleveland, Ohio v. FPC, 525 F.2d
845 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 47 FPC 747,
750 (1972). The Commission ordered, in relevant part, a 69 kv, nonsynchronous
interconnection which could at CEI's discretion, in light of its customers' best in-
terests, provide up to 40 mv of emergency power. Before power would be sup-
plied, the City had to first give CEI three hours notice and operate all of its own
generating capacity within three hours of obtaining CEI power; second, all
facilities were to be constructed by the City; third, the 30 mw load already being
served to the City by CEI continued; fourth, the City had to take immediate
steps to end the emergency; and finally, the City was forced to keep 15%
generating capacity as reserve and required to operate at least two generators.
I Commissioner Carver in his dissent believed that the majority's order of
March, 1972 "[did] not achieve anything resembling appropriate relief from an
electric reliability standpoint." 47 FPC at 751 (Carver, J., dissenting).
The limitations on interconnection which were sought by CEI were the prod-
uct of a 1969 study by a Mr. Bingham. The findings of the study were offered in
evidence by the City in an attempt to show that CEI intentionally precluded
MUNY Light from the complete benefits of interconnection. The Plain Dealer,
Sept. 25, 1980 at A-23, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July
1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 24, 1980. The City offered further evidence of a
1972 CEI memo which stated that "a higher cost burden could be maximized if a
two step deal could be clinched." The Plain Dealer, Sept. 30, 1980, at A-17, Col.
1,4; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of
Sept. 29, 1980. The NRC found that the Bingham study called for a two step deal
which would minimize the benefits of interconnection for MUNY Light: a tem-
porary 69 kv overhead tie limited to 40 my, and at some later date, a 138 kv
permanent interconnection. CEI et al., 5 NRC at 170.
"' CEI et al., NRC at 171-72. CEI wanted to be sure that MUNY Light could
only draw power from the 69 kv system when the 11 kv system was in full opera-
tion. This procedure would insure that MUNY Light would not take excess
power from CEI which would enable it to relax its own generating equipment.
The 69 kv system therefore offered little help to MUNY's long range problems.
See City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 47 FPC 747,
751 (1972) (Carver, J., dissenting).
52 CEI et al., 5 NRC at 172-73. The NRC found no justifiable reason for such a
required delay. Id.
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refusing to sell power to MUNY Light unless the City of Cleveland
would agree to a contract with CEI for the purchase of power for street
light service. 3 In response, the FPC in January, 1973, issued a further
order requiring the installation of a permanent 138 kv parallel intercon-
nection. 4 However, the interconnection did not become operational until
May of 1975, over five years after CEI had originally agreed to provide it."5
MUNY Light claims that it suffered serious damage as a result of
CEI's refusal to sell power because it was unable to maintain and ex-
pand its generating facilities. By 1977, MUNY Light was compelled to
cease most of its power generation.
2. Interconnection with Other Utilities
a. PASNY Power
The Power Authority of the State of New York (hereinafter referred
to as PASNY) generates hydroelectric power from Niagara Falls. Since
this water is public property, Congress has determined that 50% of the
power generated should be sold to public bodies and non-profit
cooperatives, some of which is specifically earmarked for companies out-
side of New York. 6 In 1971, a group of some forty municipal electric
utilities in Ohio formed American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as AMP-O). AMP-O applied for PASNY power in
January of 1973, and upon approval allocated twenty-three megawatts
(mw) of power to MUNY Light.57 PASNY agreed to wheel the power to
the Pennsylvania border, where the Pennsylvania Electric Company
Id at 173.
City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 49 FPC 118,
135-36, 98 P.U.R. 3d 309, 310 (1973).
' CEI et at, 5 NRC at 173. The city alleged that CEI attempted in 1972 to
delay and/or abate interconnection. On May 9, 1972, CEI secretly paid a third party
to file a taxpayer's suit which was aimed at stopping construction of the 69 kv
permanent interconnection which had been order by the FPC. Brief for Plaintiff,
supra note 34, at 35.
At trial, CEI stipulated that it directed an unidentified law firm to contact a
Mr. Miller on February 24, 1972. Mr. Miller subsequently attended a meeting
with Mr. Hawley, CEI's general counsel, and planned the taxpayer suit. It was
further stipulated that Mr. Miller, Mr. Hauser (CEI's corporate counsel), and Mr.
Hawley met five times between February 24, 1978 and May 9, 1972, to plan the
suit. Other evidence presented by the city showed that while CEI planned the
"Miller suit," it represented to the city the desirability of an interconnection. Mr.
Miller filed suit on May 9, 1972. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 18, 1980, at A-1, col. 5;
Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept.
17, 1980.
Niagara Power Project, 16 U.S.C. § 836 (1974). Congress conveyed to the
Power Authority of the State of New York the authority to operate, within the
guidelines set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 836, the production and distribution of Niagara
Falls Electricity. Id.
" CEI et al., 5 NRC at 174.
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was willing to wheel the power across Pennsylvania to the transmission
facilities of CEI."8
CEI refused to wheel this power to MUNY Light despite the fact that
CEI engaged in the transmission of power daily in cooperation with
other privately owned utilities, and despite the fact that CEI's transmis-
sion facilities had the necessary and available capacity. CEI explained
that since it competed with MUNY Light on a customer-to-customer
basis, the transmission of PASNY power would be injurious to CEI's
position .5
b. CAPCO Power
In March of 1971, MUNY Light requested access to the nuclear power
generated from Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver Valley nuclear power
plants. This request was refused." Two years later, MUNY Light again
requested access to this power and was again refused." CEI claimed
that CAPCO controlled the allocation of such power and that all CAPCO
members would have to agree to provide service to MUNY Light since
CEI could not do so unilaterally. 2 CEL, negotiating on behalf of CAPCO,
offered to grant access to nuclear power if MUNY Light complied with
three conditions: 1) CEI was to have a right of first refusal on nuclear
power which was in excess of MUNY Light's immediate needs; 2)
MUNY Light could not sell the power to any customers at a price that
was below cost; and 3) MUNY Light must withdraw all formal and infor-
mal requests for antitrust review of CEI policies and practices. 3 These
conditions were rejected by the City of Cleveland. Shortly thereafter,
the Board of the Atomic Energy Commission (hereinafter referred to as
AEC) granted petitions of the City of Cleveland to intervene in the
licensing proceedings for the Davis-Besse 1 and Perry nuclear power
plants. The 1977 decision in that case held:
These present conditions to nuclear access are an outrageous
affront to the policies underlying the antitrust laws. On the
basis of these attempts to stifle competition in the use of power
from the plants involved in these proceedings we would be delin-
Id. at 174-75.
09 Karl H. Rudolph, CEI President from 1970 through 1977, testified that
MUNY Light would have been better off if it had access to PASNY power. He
denied that CE's refusal to wheel power was a method which CEI intended to
use to cause MUNY Light's demise. Mr. Rudolph stated that CEI was not trying
to take over MUNY Light but rather wanted to eliminate MUNY Light competi-
tion. The Plain Dealer, Sept. 16, 1980, at A-5, col. 3; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Sept. 15, 1980.
CEI et al., 5 NRC at 175, 232-33.
61 Id. at 232-33.
62 Id at 233.
Id at 175-76.
Id at 138-39.
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quent in our responsibility were we not to impose license condi-
tions. There is no doubt that activities under the license would
be directed to the maintenance and creation of situations wholly
antagonistic to the policies of the antitrust laws.65
D. The Complaint
The City alleged that CEI violated section two of the Sherman Act by
monopeiizing and attempting to monopolize the retail sale of electricity
within CEI's service area and the City of Cleveland,66 reciting specifical-
ly:
(1) That CEI is the dominant electric utility possessing
monopoly power in the market it serves;
(2) That CEI had and has as its corporate objective the
elimination of all competition by small municipal electric
systems located in its service area;
(3) That CEI abused its dominant business position by carry-
ing out its plans of eliminating all municipal competition in its
service area, and by committing a number of destructive acts
that have injured the ability of MUNY Light to compete with
CEI; and
(4) That these destructive acts of CEI have caused injury to
the business and property of MUNY Light and the City of
Cleveland. 7
The above policies and practices by CEI can be separated into two
categories: exclusionary refusals to deal and predatory practices.
1. Exclusionary Refusals to Deal
The City claims that CEI's refusal to interconnect its transmission
system with that of MUNY Light, CEI's refusal to wheel power from
PASNY and CEI's refusal to allow MUNY Light access to the power ex-
change market constitute antitrust violations under section two of the
Sherman Act, based on the case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States." Otter Tail Power Company, a large, vertically integrated electric
utility in the Northwest, sold both wholesale power to municipal electric
systems and retail power to consumers within its service area. The
dispute arose when Otter Tail refused to sell power to certain
municipalities which had set up their own distribution systems. Further,
Otter Tail refused to wheel power made available to the municipalities
by other power producers over its transmission facilities. 9 The United
Id. at 176.
Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 34, at 56.
67 1&
410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Id. at 368-71.
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States Supreme Court found Otter Tail's refusal to deal with the
municipalities constituted illegal monopolization in violation of section
two.7" The fact that Otter Tail was a regulated monopolist did not in-
sulate Otter Tail's illegal conduct from the operation of the antitrust
laws.7'
2. Predatory Practices
Predatory practices refers to unfair conduct designed to induce
customers to cease dealing with the perpetrator's competitors."2 The
City cited as unfair business practices CEI's willingness to provide wir-
ing and other electrical equipment and services to customers for little or
no charge upon the condition that customers switch to CEI service, and
CEI's disparaging statements regarding MUNY Light's ability to pro-
vide reliable electric service.73 Specifically, the City alleged that it was
illegal for CEI to cross-subsidize its free wiring program with monopoly
profits from another market. Such an arrangement in combination with
a strategy to malign MUNY Light demonstrated CEI's intent to
eliminate MUNY Light as a competitor and was an unfair trade practice
in violation of the law. 4
In conclusion, the City alleged that: "CEI's activities effectively
reduced the net income of MUNY Light from year to year through in-
creasing its costs of operation and decreasing its revenues, and that the
effect of such injury will continue in the future."75 At trial, the City of-
fered expert testimony that, by early 1970, MUNY Light was in serious
financial trouble. MUNY Light claims to have suffered loss of revenue,
power failures and resulting damage to equipment, loss of customers, in-
creased cost of maintenance and operation, low employee morale, higher
costs to customers which decreased MUNY Light's ability to compete,
an inability to gain new customers due to its lack of ability to supply
reliable power and a lowering of its bond rating." The City alleged
damages of $150 million in its action against CEI 7
70 Id. at 377-79.
7, Id. at 376-77.
72 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 34, at 67-70.
73 Id.
" Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 34, at 68-69. See City of Mishawaka, Ind. v.
American Electric Power Company, 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1329 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(court found that it was illegal for an electric utility to publicize the fact that dur-
ing a power shortage, it would prefer its retail customers over the municipalities
or wholesale customers).
71 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 34, at 99.
76 The Plain Dealer, Oct. 15, 1980, at A-17, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Oct. 14, 1980.
77 City of Cleveland's Amended Complaint filed Sept. 6, 1980, Cleveland v.
CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975). The City reduced its damage
claim from $330 million to $150 million.
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II. THE DEFENSE
Defendant CEI presented evidence to dispute MUNY Light's factual
allegations, and additionally argued that its conduct was not, as a mat-
ter of law, a violation of the Sherman Act."8 The critical underpinning of
this argument is the "fact" that the market for distribution of electric
power in Cleveland is a natural monopoly. 9 Hence, competition is inap-
propriate, and so the Sherman Act should not apply. CEI further argued
that MUNY Light must take responsibility for its own failure in the
market place, and MUNY's damages are directly the result of
managerial incompetence.
A. The Electrical Power Industry in Cleveland is a Natural Monopoly
Electricity generation and transmission require extremely high
levels of capital investment. 1 Large and sophisticated plants must be
built, as must a circulatory network of wires connecting virtually every
residence, office, store and factory to those producing plants. Construct-
ing this system is expensive; adding new customers to an already-
constructed service network is not.82 In economic terms, the ratio of
capital investment to annual revenues is exceptionally high: about four
78 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 3-70.
, C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 191 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
KAYSEN & TURNER].
A natural monopoly is a monopoly which economists would say results from
certain economies of scale "such that one firm of efficient size can produce all or
more than the market demand and can expand its capacity at less cost than that
of a new firm entering the business." Id.
For a legal recognition of the existence of natural monopolies, see United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945), where the
Court recognized that market demand could be so small as to allow the existence
of but one competitor. Accord, Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 985 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397
(4th Cir. 1974); American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d
124, 126 (4th Cir. 1963); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, 284
F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960); North American Soccer League v. National Football
League, 465 F. Supp. 665, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Philadelphia World Hockey Club,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 457, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers Inc., 170 F. Supp. 227, 229 (N.D. Tex.
1958).
80 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 1.
81 M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT
AND OWNERSHIP 5-6 (1973); see also T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
BUSINESS 5-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
82 Id. See Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 135 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Primeaux, A
Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities, in PRO-
MOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 136, 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
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and one-half times the ratio in the iron and steel industries and over
eight times that for most other manufacturing industries.83
This characteristic of capital intensity is closely associated with the
idea of nearly-perpetual economies of scale. That is, the cost per unit of
service declines continuously until a high level of utilization is reached.
The greater the number of customers served and units of power con-
sumed, the more widely the fixed capital costs can be spread. 4 This
basic relationship is augmented by the fact that the equipment involved
in distributing electricity-high capacity lines, sub-stations and
transformers-cost less per marginal unit of capacity. Thus, the cost of
service for an entire area by a single efficient firm will be lower than if
two equally efficient enterprises duplicated capital investment to com-
pete for the same market. For these reasons, the distribution of electric
power is widely recognized by economists as a classical example of
natural monopoly, and this recognition is accepted by the judiciary.85
Most important, the fact that the electrical power industry is a
natural monopoly requires, and thereby justifies, state regulation."
Once it is understood that each defineable territory should be served by
only one firm and that the state has an interest in ensuring that all
reasonable demand be immediately met, 7 then the rationale for state
regulation is clear. A state commission approves rates sufficient to meet
expenses and render a reasonable return on invested capital. It also
restricts entry and delineates servic6 territories.88 In this manner, the
protection usually offered by competition is replaced by state regula-
tion. This is a second-best solution dictated by the natural monopoly
characteristics of the industry. To not embrace such a solution means
that there will be a wasteful duplication of resources. In Cleveland, ap-
83 See generally M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 81, at 5-6. See also
Sarikas, Financial Aspects of Utility Construction Work In Progress, 105 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 111-12 (1980): "This problem has been accentuated by the rising cost
of capital and the adverse effects of inflation which have resulted in an almost
continuous round of rate increases by utilities in spite of declining growth rates
experienced by most utilities, construction requirements continue to rise rapidly."
Id
See Hunter, Long-run Marginal Costs Lower Than Average Costs, 105 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 17-19 (1980). See generally MORGAN, supra note 81.
" See CAVES, MARKET STRUCTURE AND EMBODIED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN
REGULATING THE PRODUCT 125, 131-40 (R. Caves & M. Roberts eds. 1975); Meeks,
Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 64, 65 (1972), and authority cited therein.
Kellman, De-Utilitizing the Energy Industry: Planning the Solar Transi-
tion, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1980). See also E. SMEAD, GOVERNMENTAL PROMOTION
AND REGULATION OF BUSINESS 438-57 (1969).
1 Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope
and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 314-23 (1962).
88 1&
[Vol. 30:5
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss1/7
CLEVELAND V. CEI
proximately ten million dollars worth of excess transmission lines and
equipment exist within the thirty square mile area of MUNY Light's
operating territory.s9
B. Sherman Act Prohibitions Against Monopolization Are
Inappropriate In A Natural Monopoly Market
CEI contends that MUNY Light's facts at worst allege a corporate
policy of CEI to refuse to help MUNY stay afloat." In a natural monopo-
ly market, such refusal is legitimate.9 1 Only one firm should function in
that market. If more than one exists, there will be a battle between
them to see which survives. The test of survival is the ability of each
firm to allocate resources efficiently and serve the public. In a relatively
short period of time, the market will, if left alone, force one firm to leave
the market; productive resources will be consolidated into one operating
entity, thereby taking maximum advantage of economies of scale," and
regulation will ensue to promote the public interest.93 Thus, competition
between two firms in a natural monopoly market is inherently exclu-
sionary. The loss of one firm is natural; there is no injury to the
marketplace or consumers.94
Should the antitrust laws which were avowedly designed to en-
courage competition require that one firm support its competitor's abili-
ty to do business in a natural monopoly market? Such a requirement
seems absurd. To posit that one competitor must support the other is to
ignore the nature of that market and replace the law's legitimate goal of
efficiently allocating resources with the misguided desire to protect
weak firms from the rigors of competition.95 MUNY Light's territory is
1 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 3-70. At trial Robert M. Kemper, CEI
engineer, testified that the retail electric market in Cleveland was a natural
monopoly market where but one firm can survive. Further, Mr. Kemper testified
that there exists within the city ten million dollars of excess distribution
facilities. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 21, 1980, at 15-A, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No.
C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Oct. 20, 1980.
Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 3-70.
91 Id. CEI argued that there is no legal or logical basis for which competition
may be protected in a natural monopoly market. Further, because there is no
valid competition in a natural monopoly market, such a market cannot constitute
a relevant market for Sherman Act purposes. See United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956).
9 See MORGAN, supra note 81, at 5-22; contra, Primeaux, supra note 82, at
175.
91 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 29, at 47-63.
94 Id. "Where the monopoly is known to be inevitable, suit is unfairly burden-
some to the defendant ...." Id
91 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977). See
also Kellman, Vertical Territorial Restrictions and the Limits of Planning, 46 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 1107 (1979).
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completely subsumed by CEI's service area. The two are direct com-
petitors in a market which would be best served by the more efficient
firm. Why then, even if CEI did refuse to deal with MUNY Light, should
that raise an antitrust issue? Does CEI have a legal obligation to keep
MUNY Light in business?
Section two of the Sherman Act prohibits the deliberate use of
market power96 to acquire or maintain a monopoly position in the
marketplace. 7 The mere possession of monopoly power as the result of a
superior product, business acumen or historic accident is legal. 8
However, a firm transgresses the limits of the law when it willfully ex-
cludes competitors.9 Such culpability will be found when a firm with
monopoly power engages in activity which is intentionally an-
ticompetitive, tortious or a collusive restraint of trade. Thus, if a
monopolist agrees to participate in a price fixing agreement9 ° or a
group boycott,' enforces illegal tying arrangements"2 or a resale price
" American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-11 (1946). Market
power or monopoly power is the power to control price or exclude competition.
See Lipson, Monopolization: Traditional Standards and Future Directions, 47
ANTITRUST L.J. 1116, 1117 (1978). The power to either control price or exclude
competition is sufficient for a finding of monopoly power. The percentage of the
market which the alleged monopolist controls is an important factor in determin-
ing the existence of monopoly power. United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 384 (1956). See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 102-13 (1976).
11 United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). In Grinnel, the
Court defined the elements of the monopolization offense under section two as
follows: the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power in the relevant market. In order to
determine the existence of monopoly power under Grinnel, one must first find
the extent and nature of the relevant geographic and product markets. See F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 52-57
(1970). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (setting
forth the legal criteria of a submarket).
98 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir.
1945). See also Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272-74 (2d Cir.
1979); Sargent Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir.
1977); Transamerica Computer Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Telex Corp. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 341
(N.D. Okla. 1973); Bailey's Bakery L.T.C. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp.
705, 719 (D. Hawaii 1964).
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). "[The unification of
power and control over petroleum ... which was the inevitable result of ... ag-
gregating so vast a capital, gives rise ... to the prima facie presumption of intent
and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the oil industry ... with the purpose
of excluding others .. " Id at 75.
'® United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-18 (1940).
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
102 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
(1953).
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maintenance scheme,' 3 impermissibly extends the scope of a patent' or
commits a business tort in an effort to drive a competitor out of
business, ' then the courts will find such conduct inherently an-
ticompetitive and illegal. Such unilateral conduct by a firm with
monopoly power violates section two.' 6 But a firm may legally possess
monopoly power if it does not engage in anticompetitive conduct.' 7
Presumably, the firm's normal conduct of day-to-day business is legal;
no one could fault the monopoly firm for being efficient, even if less effi-
cient firms might find it difficult to enter or stay in the market. The
case law specifically provides that a firm with monopoly power is en-
couraged to compete against those who offer similar products.'0 Innova-
tion, efficiency, better foresight and a commitment to work harder are
all virtues which a competitive market must reward, regardless of the
firm's size."' Thus, the sole participant in a market which is "so limited
that it is impossible to produce at all except by a plant large enough to
supply the whole demand""' does not violate the law by pursuing
business opportunities, even if other firms find it difficult to compete."'
Given this framework, the question becomes how the law treats a
refusal to deal by a firm in a natural monopoly market. Refusals to deal
are presumptively legal."' A business entity may or may not deal with
any one it chooses. A small firm in a competitive market may refuse to
deal with impunity so long as that refusal is unilateral and an intent to
monopolize or restrain trade cannot be inferred from other conduct."' A
Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
104 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947).
"15 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspaper of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584
(1st Cir. 1960).
"I It has long been held that the possession of monopoly power which is ac-
quired or maintained through acts which violate § 1 will constitute a violation of
§ 2 as well. See generally Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S.
110, 129-30 (1948).
"0 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
"o United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
'o Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1979).
"' United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 29, at 47-63.
' Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 175, 228-33 (1979). "The federal courts have ruled
that in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the Sher-
man Act ... does not restrict the right of a trader nor manufacturer engaged in an
entirely private business, from freely exercising his own independent discretion
as to the parties with whom he will deal." Id at 230. See also United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
"' Daily Press Inc. v. United States Int'l, 412 F.2d 126, 135 (6th Cir. 1969)
(where a buyer requests a special deal, it is not a refusal to deal for the seller to
reject the buyer's terms).
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firm with monopoly power, however, violates the law by refusing to deal
in the event that viable competitors are denied access to needed sup-
plies. This refusal may be likened to creating a bottleneck in the free
flow of goods and, by that means, unfairly foreclosing the opportunity to
compete." ' Only where the inherent effect of the monopolist's refusal is
the foreclosure of competition has section two's prohibition been vio-
lated."'
The act of refusing to deal with a competitor does not per se violate
the law; rather, such an act may be evidence of an intent to exclude com-
petition. It is the intent which, if combined with the power to realize the
result, threatens competition."6 However, in the setting of a natural
monopoly market, a refusal to supply a competitor is not an act of
monopolization-it is a legitimate competitive act regardless of the
refuser's large market share."7 In this market, no competition should ex-
ist as competition is itself inefficient. A refusal to help a competitor
compete is not an act of monopolization, but is rather a legitimate at-
tempt to respond to the peculiar economic facts of the marketplace. In a
market where only one can serve, the policy of section two which pro-
"' The test as stated in Colgate has often been called the "purpose test."
Under this test, intent to create or maintain a monopoly is the key to finding a
violation of § 2. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359, 375-76 (1927). In Kodak, the Court used the purpose test to find that
Kodak's refusal to deal constituted a violation of § 2. See Robinson v. Magovern,
456 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (W.D. Pa. 1978), which held that the Colgate doctrine "is
not applicable where the refusal to deal is anti-competitive in purpose or effect,
or both, or is in restraint of trade." Id. See Note, Refusals to Deal by Vertically
Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1740 (1974).
Under the bottleneck theory of monopolization, the monopolist at the supply
level is assumed to have a legal monpoly at that level. To violate § 2, the
monopolist's refusal to deal must cause the injured competitor to lose its ability
to gain supply of the target product. Further, the refusal to deal must give the
monopolist a competitive advantage. Note that if the competitive advantage is
the result of superior skill or ability and not the result of the refusal to deal,
there is no violation of § 2.
"I Otter Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Accord, Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal Railroad
Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d
1317 (9th Cir. 1975); Gamco Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194
F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 362 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
116 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 173-85. See Byars v. Bluff City News
Co., 609 F.2d 843, 855, (6th Cir. 1979), where the court extended presumptive
legality to a refusal to deal by a vertically integrated monopolist. Further, the
court found that even the use of unfair methods of competition by a seller would
not necessarily result in a violation unless an adverse impact upon the market
could be shown. Accord, Ace Beer Distributors, Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283,
286-87 (6th Cir. 1963); Industrial Building Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp.,
278 F. Supp. 938, 957-60 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
" Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 109-119, 142-48.
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hibits monopolization of competitive markets does not apply. The
refusal to supply electricity is no more inherently anticompetitive than
refusing to lend money to one's competitor. In either event, the com-
petitor may be worse off for the refusal, but the mere refusal is not il-
legal."8 The antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, not com-
petitors."9 Even if the consequence of the refusal is the demise of the
competitor, no anticompetitive injury has been suffered since in a
natural monopoly market the final outcome of one firm serving the en-
tire market is rational. It follows that, in a natural monopoly market, a
firm facing competition can at worst be accused of committing a
business tort actionable in the state courts. No antitrust injury within
the meaning of section two can thus occur.'20
CEI has competed against MUNY Light. Both have sought to serve
the electric market in Cleveland. The only rational result of this com-
petition should be the success of the more efficient firm (subject, of
course, to state utility regulation),'"' and the eventual exit of the loser.
MUNY Light has no generation capacity; it can only take power from
CEI and re-sell it to the consumer.' Only by using city revenues to sub-
sidize its operations could MUNY Light compete.' 3 MUNY Light's ex-
istence did not result in an increase of power to consumers, nor did it
result in an enlarged distribution system. The only tangible result of
MUNY Light's existence was that resources were inefficiently
duplicated.' 4 To sell or wheel power to MUNY Light would further
waste the public's resources and only prolong the inevitable. CEI's
refusal to supply was not injurious to competition; it was the reasonable
exercise of business judgment by utility executives statutorily
obligated to provide a public service.' 5 A refusal to deal which is not an-
ticompetitive is, as stated above, legal. Therefore, CEI did not violate
section two of the Sherman Act.
"I Id. at 148-65. See Watson and Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated
'Monopolies' The Search for Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559,
566 (1977); See also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 29, at 239.
"- See II E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 130 (1980).
'2 See KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 79, at 191.
"' See note 86 supra and accompanying text. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4901
(Page 1977), sets out the organizational characteristics of the public utilities com-
mission. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905 (Page 1977), sets out the general powers of
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906 (Page 1977),
gives the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio the power to control the location of
generation and transmission facilities within Ohio.
'" See Brief for Defendant, supra note 11.
123 Id.
124 Id
12 Id. See note 11 supra. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 4906.10(6) (Page
1977).
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C. MUNY Light's Demise Was Self-Inflicted
Certainly no firm is responsible for the business setbacks of its com-
petitor if that competitor suffered from incompetent management. It is
the position of CEI that mismanagement was to blame for MUNY
Light's failure to compete effectively.
1 26
Since its inception, MUNY Light's growth has depended on CEI. As
early as 1907 CEI provided temporary service to MUNY"' Since then,
CEI has regularly provided standby service. This dependence is neither
new nor the result of CEI's conduct; rather, MUNY Light has been forc-
ed to rely on CEI because of its own ill-advised managerial decisions. 28
While most utility firms pursued conservative plans designed to in-
1 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 47. "The decline of MELP [MUNY
Light] was caused by a combination of market forces and the managerial failings
of successive city administrations, which either did not grasp the nature of elec-
tric power service . . . or were politically unwilling or unable to react
accordingly." Id.
12 Id. at 54.
128 Id. at 55; The Plain Dealer, Feb. 11, 1979, at 1-A, col. 1. Fred Sener, a CEI
engineer, testified that a permanent interconnection between MUNY Light and
CEI could have been in place by June of 1974 rather than May of 1975. He
testified that the delay was due to the City's failure to finance the operation. Fur-
ther, Mr. Sener testified that any delays in the completion of the temporary tie in
1972 were clearly the fault of the city. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 22, 1980, at 16-A,
col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of
Oct. 21, 1980. Testimony of Edward J. Fowlkes, engineer with Federal Power
Commission in early 1970's, tended to support the conclusion of Mr. Sener as to
the City's fault in the delays in completing a permanent interconnection in 1975.
Mr. Fowlkes also testified that CEI did not operate the 11 kv overhead tie in a
manner which was below industry standards. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 23, 1980, at
22-A, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), pro-
ceedings of Oct. 22, 1980.
Alan D. Donheiser of Arthur D. Little Inc., management consultant for CEI,
testified that MUNY Light's problems were the result of twenty years of
mismanagement. Using data compiled by CEI, Mr, Donheiser felt that MUNY
Light's management failed to properly plan for the future and did not carry out
their long range goals. Specifically, he stated that MUNY Light officials had
problems "dealing with the Cleveland City Council and described said dealings as
cumbersome and ineffective.... " The Plain Dealer, Oct. 24, 1980, at 10-B, col. 1;
Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), proceedings of Oct.
23, 1980.
William Chaney, CEI engineering consultant, testified that MUNY Light could
have interconnected with three other private utilities, Pennsylvania Electric Co.,
Ohio Power Co., and Ohio Edison Co., all of which do not compete with MUNY
Light. All of said companies are CAPCO members. Further, Mr. Chaney testified
that in 1961, MUNY Light could have and should have interconnected with the
Painesville and Orrville municipal systems. Mr. Chaney stressed the fact that
CEI would not have been a viable choice for interconnection due to the fact that
it is in direct competition with MUNY Light. The Plain Dealer, Oct. 23, 1980, at
22-A, col. 1; Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1975), pro-
ceedings of Oct. 22, 1980.
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crease distribution while expanding generating capacity, MUNY Light
recklessly expanded its distribution territory without replacing or
developing its generating capacity. During the 1930's MUNY Light suc-
cessfully grew by over 10,000 customers (most of whom were
changeovers from CEI service), but did not add or replace generating
capacity.2 9 In 1940, MUNY's strained and aged generating capacity gave
way, and CEI actually served MUNY's load for eleven months. 13' For the
next ten years, MUNY's peak load exceeded its capacity. 3'
During the post-World War II period, larger generators offering in-
creased efficiency were introduced causing greatly increased capital and
maintenance costs.'32 Consequently, greater load factors were needed to
justify the investment, and greater reserve capacity was required to in-
sure reliability. Instead of responding to these circumstances, MUNY
pushed the limits of its capacity. Major outages occurred in 1958, 1961,
1965 and 1966.' Eleven outages in 1969 alone culminated in the break-
down of the new 85 megawatt unit.' Continuous outages through 1974
have rendered MUNY Light totally dependent upon load transfer service
provided by CEL. 35
MUNY Light's operations have been characterized by bloated ad-
ministrative and labor costs. The company survived only because of an
artificial rate differential supported by municipal funds.'36 MUNY Light
paid no taxes by virtue of its status as a municipal corporation. CEI, of
course, pays taxes. This savings, having nothing to do with efficiency,
allowed MUNY Light to charge consumers less per kilowatt hour, but in
fact it was the consumer who subsidized his rate bill with his tax
payments.' More important than MUNY's tax-free status was the sub-
sidy it received from inflated charges to the City of Cleveland for street
lighting services. These higher-than-market rates permitted MUNY
Light to cross-subsidize its retail operations with city revenues.'38 But in
the capital-dependent electric industry, sustained use of aging produc-
' Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 56.
I& at 57-58.
131 Id
12 Id See M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 81, at 5-6.
'= Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 61.
Id at 62.
131 The Plain Dealer, Feb. 12, 1979, at 1-A, col. 1.
131 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 48. CEI alleged that MUNY Light
could not exist in the natural monopoly market but for its artificial cross sub-
sidization of its retail rates with profits from electricity sold to the City. While
the rates MUNY Light charged for retail service rose, CEI alleged said rates
rose only a small amount compared to the rates charged to the City for public
loads.
121 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 46-52.
' CEI et al., 5 NRC at 167. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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tion facilities without maintenance led to power outages which grew
progressively worse as outdated equipment failed to meet increased de-
mand."3 9 In 1962, rather than interconnect with nearby electrical
systems, MUNY Light planned to install generating capacity substan-
tially in excess of MUNY's expected load growth. " ° By 1971, MUNY was
bankrupt. Only CEI's continued and stable presence kept the citizens of
Cleveland out of the dark. In effect, MUNY's suit complains that CEI
has not done enough to revive its incompetent competitor who, never-
theless, remains determined to render useless CEI's investment in
Cleveland."'
III. ANALYSIS
To sue successfully under section two, MUNY Light must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that CEI monopolized or attempted to
monopolize the electric distribution market in Cleveland. MUNY Light
has no obligation to prove that competition will increase efficiency in
the generation or distribution of electricity. The antitrust laws
themselves reflect a Congressional policy that free and open markets
will supply more goods for lower prices as well as provide consumers a
greater choice. Since firms with monopoly power can clog the free flow
of goods, the purpose of antitrust law is to diffuse sectors of concen-
trated economic power. Therefore, proof of the use of such monopoly
power to exclude competition, existing or potential, establishes a prima
facie case of illegality.
In this case, the legal issue is whether CEI can successfully
demonstrate an affirmative defense to MUNY Light's evidence of a
monopolistic refusal to deal. CEI's complex attempt to do so weaves
together three well known responses to the charge of monopolization: (1)
as a regulated utility, CEI is outside of the scope of antitrust jurisdic-
tion; (2) possession of monopoly power is lawful if achieved by lawful
means; and (3) as a natural monopolist, CEI's refusal to deal with MUNY
Light was legitimate competitive conduct. In order to resolve this con-
troversy, it is therefore necessary to untangle a considerable quantity
of case law.
As a threshold matter, CEI's contention that a regulated utility is ex-
empt from the jurisdiction of the antitrust laws is legally unsupportable.
CEI's business was stipulated to involve interstate commerce; the
jurisdictional requirements of the law have thereby been met. The
scope of Sherman Act jurisdiction is limited only by express exemp-
tions. Electric utilities are not so expressly exempt. The judiciary in re-
"3 Brief for Defendant, supra note 11, at 61-62.
Id. at 62-65.
Id at 1-2.
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cent years has consistently and repeatedly refused to grant an exemp-
tion to regulated utilities accused of anticompetitive behavior.4 '
The second component of CEI's argument, while legally supportable,
can be disposed of as factually inapplicable. Since the early decision in
United States v. United States Steel Corp.,'43 the judiciary has recog-
nized that section two does not condemn successful acquisition of a large
market share by innovative or skillful business tactics. There must be
some aspect of anticompetitive conduct to support a finding of illegal
monopolization. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,' Judge
Hand formulated the defense for acquisition of monopoly power as a
result of "superior skill, foresight and industry .... The successful com--
petitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when
he wins."'45 More recently, the Second Circuit in Berkey Photo v.
Eastman Kodak'.. held that neither Kodak's introduction of a new and
innovative photographic system without prior notification to com-
petitors, nor its marketing a new film which could only be used in con-
junction with the new camera, constituted an illegal act of monopoliza-
tion despite Kodak's monopoly share of the relevant market. Even
though Kodak's competitors were no doubt injured by the introduction
of the "126" system, and no one seriously questioned Kodak's monopoly
power, the innovation was an example of legitimate conduct under the
Sherman Act.
The defense of "superior skill, foresight and industry" is, if factually
applicable, an absolute defense. It strikes to the very heart of the policy
considerations underlying section two. The purpose of the law is to pro-
mote competition, and high on the list of legitimate competitive tactics
is innovation. The firm having a monopoly share of the market does not
violate the law through innovation. The courts will not punish proper
competitive conduct regardless of its effect on smaller competitors. Yet,
as stated above, this defense is not applicable here. While reasonable
disagreement may exist as to whether a refusal to deal is inherently
anticompetitive there can be no question that such refusal is not an ex-
ample of superior skill, foresight and industry. In this controversy, CEI
is not accused of having taken advantage of innovative development.
"' Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1979); FPC v. Conway Corp.,
426 U.S. 271 (1976); City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 560
F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); see Central Power and
Light Co. v. PUC of Texas, 592 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1979); City of Butania v. FPC,
548 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Town of Norwood v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally City of Lafayette v. Louisiana P. & L. Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978).
"1 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
"14 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
".. Id. at 429.
1,6 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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The complaint against CEI alleges a monopolistic refusal to sell and to
wheel power with intent to exclude a competitior. If true, the allegation
is not defensible as superior competitive performance.
With the unravelling of these peripheral defenses, it is possible to
more clearly examine the natural monopoly defense. Ironically, while
the natural monopoly defense shares little in theory or application with
the defense of superior skill, foresight and industry, both are derived
from the same paragraph in Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion. The following
two sentences are the genesis of CEI's argument:
Persons may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a
monopoly automatically so to say: that is, without having intended
either to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent com-
petition from arising when none had existed; they become
monopolists by force of accident. A market may, for example, be
so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the
cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand. '47
The key to understanding this controversy in terms of antitrust doc-
trine is to distinguish the natural monopoly defense from Kodak's ap-
plication of superior skill, foresight and industry. The latter defense, if
proven, is absolute; it goes to the essence of what the law means by anti-
competitive conduct. By contrast, the natural monopoly defense merely
asserts that one firm's possession of a large market share is not
presumptively anticompetitive where the technological process involves
such enormous capital investments that realizable economies of scale
are nearly perpetual. The theory of natural monopoly does justify utility
regulation for electricity and gas distribution and for telephone com-
munications; it has long been recognized that a regulated electric utility
serving 100% of the market does not necessarily violate the law simply
by virtue of its size. Thus, the natural monopoly defense means that
where the relevant market can support only one firm, the inability of
other competitors to compete does not by itself establish a prima facie
case of monopolization. However, the defense, even if proven, does not
resolve the antitrust controversy; it does not fundamentally address the
question of whether the defendant's conduct was anticompetitive. The
defendant who can prove that two or more firms cannot efficiently
serve the relevant market may still be subject to the charge that, in
competing for the position of sole market participant, it has engaged in
anticompetitive conduct which unfairly excluded its competitor from at-
taining the sought after position. As will be discussed at length below,
the successful interposition of this "natural monopoly" defense can
significantly increase MUNY Light's burden of proving a cause of action
under section two, but the important point is that even if the distribu-
147 148 F.2d at 430.
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tion of electrical power in Cleveland is a natural monopoly, CEI is still
required under the antitrust laws to abstain from engaging in an-
ticompetitive conduct.
Two critical issues derive from the foregoing analysis: Can CEI prove
that another firm's presence in the market is necessarily inefficient? If
so, can MUNY Light prove that CEI's conduct was, in light of the
natural monopoly characteristics of the market, anticompetitive?
A. The Role of Competition in the Distribution of Electricity
CEI has argued that because the distribution of electric power in
Cleveland is a natural monopoly, its willful refusal to sell or to wheel
power to MUNY Light was not an act of illegal monopolization. The
critical flaw in CEI's argument is that competition has an important role
to play in the electrical industry. The existence of utility regulation
establishes only a presumption, not a conclusion, that the presence of
two or more firms is inefficient.
The electric power industry performs three vertically integrated
functions: generation of power, transmission of that power in bulk and
distribution of electricity to the ultimate consumer. Commonly, a large,
integrated enterprise serves an extensive geographic area, with smaller
cooperative or municipal systems purchasing wholesale power from it
and distributing the power to "islands" within the larger firm's sphere
of operation.4 '
1. Generation
Sizeable quantities of electrical power can be generated by hydroelec-
tric or steam turbine plants. The latter may be fueled by oil, natural
gas, coal or nuclear energy. The economies of scale available through
the use of large capacity generating units are enormous. Therefore,
most plant construction today involves large facilities. To construct a
large generating facility, an electric company must obtain necessary
state and federal permits and licenses.149 As a threshold matter, the ap-
plicant must establish that a specified sector of consumers needs the
power. If there is no need for the power within the area to be served
then the application should not be approved. ° Correspondingly, if there
146 See generally Meeks, Concentration In The Electric Power Industry: The
Impact of Antitrust Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Meeks].
19 See generally Quarles, Federal Regulations of New Industrial Plants, 11
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) MONOGRAPHS 28 (May 4, 1979).
150 The determination of need is typically made by the state utility commission
and this finding is rarely challenged by a federal agency. The Atomic Energy
Act, for example, specifically provides that state public utility commissions are
empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for power. 42 U.S.C. §
2021 (1977).
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is an unsatisfied need for power, the economies of scale available in the
construction and operation of generating facilities usually require that a
minimal number of large units be built to meet that need. In this very
real sense, the generation of large quantities of power to satisfy ex-
clusively local demand should be undertaken by only one firm. These
technological characteristics justify a regulatory commission's adverse
determination regarding a competitive facility on the grounds that the
area is adequately served by an existing supplier. Yet this outcome does
not determine that the generation of electrical power is a natural
monopoly function. On the contrary, generating large quantities of elec-
tric power is in many respects similar to most basic production in-
dustries for which competition serves as the primary regulatory control.
Given a broader view of the relevant geographic market, it is apparent
that many firms generate power and that this power can be sold com-
petitively across service territories. Furthermore, recent developments
in small-scale and cogeneration technologies indicate that competition
can have a greater role in electricity generation. Large industrial and
agricultural users are increasingly generating some or all of their own
power. Indeed, the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978
(PURPA)... specifically recognizes the role that competitive forces can
have by providing that excess power produced by non-utilities may be
sold without objection to the local utility at the prevailing rates.152 In
this manner, PURPA demonstrates a Congressional acceptance of com-
petition principles which have been developed by the courts in regard to
previous antitrust challenges to utility activity.'53
2. Transmission
The transmission of bulk power is truly a natural monopoly function.
Competitive transmission facilities are undesirable for economic and en-
vironmental reasons. Their high fixed costs render it far cheaper to
build one transmission grid rather than two or more parallel grids. In
addition, aesthetic and land use considerations require the fewest lines
possible. In this sense, bulk transmission facilities are analogous to
railroad tracks or long-distance telephone lines. Under the common law,
these other natural monopoly distribution systems have been treated as
common carriers. Analogous principles have, in the last decade, been im-
plemented under the antitrust laws regarding electrical distribution.'5 4
'5' 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2645 (West Supp. 1981).
152 Id § 824a-3.
" These principles were shaped into their present form primarily by the
Federal Communications Commission in regard to competition for telecom-
munications services. See Kellman, supra note 86, at 32-44.
" Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope
and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv 312 (1962).
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Large systems which control sectors of the transmission grid can ex-
clude competition, at either the generation level or the distribution
level, by refusing to allow access to potentially alternative sources of
power. The monopoly over transmission by vertically-integrated
systems "presents the most serious obstacle to potential competition.....
Antitrust law has long recognized that the use of legitimately obtained
monopoly power at one level of production to extend into another level
of production is illegal under section two. Indeed, in Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States,'" the Supreme Court confronted this exact ques-
tion and held that the monopolistic refusal to wheel power so that Otter
Tail, a large integrated utility, could extend itself into the distribution
market was illegal. That decision, a clear manifestation of traditional an-
titrust doctrine, remains the dominant legal statement on attempts by
regulated utilities to extend their state-granted monopoly power into
adjoining markets. Given its straightforward application, there should
be no question that CEI's refusal to wheel power from PASNY was, if
excess capacity is factually proven, per se illegal.
3. Distribution
CEI would distinguish Otter Tail on the grounds that that decision in-
volved the extension of monopoly power from one level of production
(transmission) to a distinctly different level of production (distribution)
whereas CEI and MUNY Light were direct competitors in the same dis-
tribution market. Even if this distinction is meaningful, it does not ad-
dress the central fact that competition offers significant advantages for
the local distribution of power. Five benefits offered by an existing
municipal power company in competition with an integrated utility can
be identified:
a. Yardstick competition refers to the effect that a competing
municipal power system can have on an integrated firm's rate-
making determinations. According to the theoretical basis for
regulating electric companies, the state commission sets rates at
a level sufficient only to compensate the firm for its costs plus a
reasonable return on its invested capital. Were this process ab-
solutely precise, yardstick competition would be of no value.
However, belief that such precision actually typifies the rate
process is a naivete which the law has not blindly accepted.
Rates are made within a "zone of reasonableness" '57 between a
ceiling and a floor which may at times be quite vast. Another
firm's presence in the market requires that the regulatory body
'5 Meeks, supra note 148, at 87.
150 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
157 FPC v. Conway, 426 U.S. 271, 278 (1976).
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confront adversary evidence regarding costs, thereby resulting
both in a better informed commission as well as a downward
pressure on rates. A yardstick competitor can, therefore, offer a
moderating pressure on the rates of large electric firms.
b. Competition for new customers. Electrical markets are con-
stantly expanding as population and technology expand.
Residential developments and shopping centers on the exterior
fringes of a service territory invite competition for the right to
serve. Similarly, electric firms regularly vie to serve new in-
dustrial facilities. This direct competition among firms at the
same level of production is precisely the activity to be encourag-
ed and promoted under the antitrust laws.
Yardstick competition and competition for new customers are forces
which can exist any time two or more electrical distribution firms trade
in the same market. That one of those firms is a municipally-owned com-
pany is irrelevant; any competing firm can foster such competition.
Whether or not these two forces are strong enough to warrant a total
abandonment of the natural monopoly concept as applied to electricity
distribution is debatable, but not directly relevant to this controversy.
Here, the competing firm is a municipally-owned company and as such
can supply three additional competitive forces:
c. Access to cheaper fuel supplies. Municipal utilities in the Nor-
theast have access to inexpensive hydroelectric power
generated by the Power Authority of the State of New York. By
purchasing this power, a cost savings can be passed along to the
consumer, an advantage which an investor-owned utility cannot
provide. In addition, with the increasing development of alter-
native energy sources, the prospect for inexpensive municipal
generation of power have never been brighter. Conversion of
municipal biomass to methane gas which can then fuel electrical
generation is a proven technique in the early stages of commer-
cial application."' As the price of conventional fuel soars, alter-
native technologies available to public bodies will become in-
creasingly important.
d. Ability to realize consumption efficiencies. As the need to
conserve energy while levelling peak/off-peak loads grows more
critical, so does the ability of local firms to encourage thrifty use
of power. Municipal firms can effect temperature and lighting
controls in public buildings, parks and streets. Patterns of
energy use can be manipulated by municipal development agen-
158 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS LANDFILL METHANE UTILIZATION
TECHNOLOGY WORKBOOK, The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory, April 1980; Fourth Report to Congress, Resource Recovery and
Waste Reduction, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1977.
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cies, regulatory bodies and the municipal power company. Such
coordination is a highly complex task, but significant savings can
be realized if local governments will recognize their oppor-
tunities.
e. No need to pay dividends. An investor-owned utility ac-
quires capital from the national financial market and compen-
sates for the use of that capital by payment of dividends to its
stockholders. Thus, that portion of a company's rates
represented as the reasonable return on capital investment is
essentially a transfer of wealth from the local consumers of
power to a group of nationally diverse investors. By contrast, a
municipal utility is owned by the community; no dividends are
paid. Every dollar of revenue over the cost of providing service
remains in the locality. Capital is raised through the issuance of
tax exempt revenue bonds.
These advantages of municipal electric companies may account for the
existence of over 2,000 such firms in forty-eight states supplying power
to 13/o of the consumers in the United States.'59 It may further explain
why the State of Ohio specifically provides for the existence of
municipally-owned electric companies and gives to municipalities the
right to control the distribution of electric power within their borders.6 0
Finally, these advantages may explain why the voters of Cleveland have
consistently supported the continued existence of MUNY Light.'
All of these considerations come to this: In a free market democracy,
the public as voters and consumers must determine the appropriate
market structure for the production and distrubution of goods and ser-
vices. For a variety of historical reasons, the people of Cleveland, Ohio,
have chosen to maintain MUNY Light as a distributor of electrical
power. This choice may reflect a popular evaluation of how trustworthy
the managers of electric power companies are. Perhaps it reflects a con-
cern over a perceived inability of state regulators to control utilities'
rates and service. The motives behind the public's approval of and sup-
port for MUNY Light are no doubt numerous and complex; but no
economic model, regardless of its elegance, can prove that such a choice
is irrational. Where competition exists and where the affected con-
sumers have expressed their collective willingness to support that com-
petition, then a utility's protestations that the electric industry cannot
tolerate competition are meaningless. The efficiency or inefficiency of
competitive electric distrubution companies should be determined by
consumers, not CEI.
A strong argument can be made that the natural monopoly concept
should have no application to the distribution of electrical power. The
099 Meeks, supra note 148, at 67-68.
Id. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 743.26 et seq. (Page 1976 & Supp. 1980).
... See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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courts have not, however, gone so far. More accurately, the burden of
proof should be on the party claiming the natural monopoly defense to
prove that those competitive forces either cannot exist in the relevant
market or are definitely outweighed by the actual economies which can
be realized from the exclusion of competition. While this formulation
leaves it to a jury to decide whether a local distribution market is a
natural monopoly, the burden of proof on the defendant to so prove is
enormous.
B. The Legal Evaluation of CEI's Conduct
If the jury finds that competition can be advantageous to the con-
sumers of electricity in Cleveland, then CEI's refusal to sell and wheel
power-coupled with its announced intent to eliminate MUNY Light as
a competitor-conclusively establishes illegal monopolization. In such
event, no further analysis is necessary. If, however, the jury finds that
as a matter of fact competition confers no advantages because of the
natural monopoly characteristics of the market, then the burden of proof
switches back to the plaintiff to establish that defendant's conduct con-
stituted unfair trade practices which are inherently anticompetitive.
That the natural monopoly defense may be defeated by a showing of
unfair trade practices is a principle derived from Judge Wyzanski's opi-
nion in Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England."2 The rele-
vant market in that case-newspaper publishing in Haverhill,
New Hampshire-was only large enough to support one newspaper. The
Haverhill Gazette exclusively served this market until 1957 when Union
Leader Corp. (ULC), publisher of the nearby Manchester Union, entered
the Haverhill market seeking to displace the Gazette. In the ensuing
battle, ULC organized a group boycott of the Gazette, bribed advertisers
by use of secret rebates and engaged in systematic price discrimination.
Judge Wyzanski held that while legitimate competition-including
underpricing one's competitor-is legal regardless of the effects on ex-
isting or potential competitors, it is illegal in a natural monopoly market
to engage in anticompetitive conduct so as to exclude an existing
market participant: "In a situation where it is inevitable that only one
competitor survive, the evidence which shows the use, or contemplated
use, of unfair means is the very same evidence of exclusionary intent."163
Considerable authority has recognized the contribution of Union
Leader to antitrust theory."4 In a natural monopoly market there is no
61 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass.), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
1 Id. at 140.
16 International Travel Arrangers v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255,
1268 (8th Cir. 1980); Mid-Texas Communications v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372, 1388
(5th Cir. 1980); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Company, 461 F.2d 506, 514 (6th Cir.
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long-term price or service competition among firms for a marginal sale,
and entry by new firms is severely limited. Therefore, the most viable
form of competition is among two firms engaged in a struggle for sur-
vival. Since the winner will determine the nature of the market for
years to come, the choice should be made on the basis of projected long-
run efficiency, not because one firm can temporarily dominate the other
by leveling an unfair blow. Though a firm which enters another firm's
exclusive market does not thereby violate the law by legitimately and
efficiently doing business, acquisition of a monopoly position must
reflect real managerial superiority. To use predatory or exclusionary
tactics to acquire sole possession of a natural monopoly market by forc-
ing one's competitors out of business is an egregious offense of
monopolization. In such circumstances, the natural monopoly defense is
nothing more than a self-fulfilling and self-serving prophecy.
The natural monopoly defense, properly understood, is innocent
enough: a firm does not violate the law simply by being the only entity
of its type within the relevant market. If the market is so thin as to sup-
port only one firm, the law will not punish that firm. In the context of
regulated industries, the defense is applicable to utilities who serve
their operating territories subject to state regulation. But the natural
monopoly defense does not exempt capital intense industries from an-
titrust enforcement, nor is it an excuse for anticompetitive conduct. The
electrical industry is not simply and entirely a natural monopoly in-
dustry. Certain sectors of that industry have, for a variety of
reasons, been organized according to the economic principles of natural
monopoly regulation. Of course, no antitrust issue is raised thereby.
Nevertheless, when one electric firm has faced direct competition for
seventy years, that firm cannot force its competitor out of business by
denying access to needed supplies of power and then attempt to shroud
itself by arguing from economic theory that, after all, only one firm
should distribute electricity. It is critical to understand that the more
limited the opportunities to compete, the more important the preserva-
tion of existing competitors becomes. Thus, to define a market as
"natural monopoly" should evoke the most stringent antitrust scrutiny
of any attempt to eliminate competition. To claim a defense for an-
ticompetitive behavior because of the inherent level of concentrated
resources is to stand antitrust policy on its head. If indeed electrical
distribution is a natural monopoly, than rather than justify an antitrust
1972); Auburn News Co. Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F.Supp. 292, 304 (D.
R.I. 1980); Homefinders of America, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 471 F. Supp.
416 (D. R.I. 1979). See also Cooper, Attempts & Monopolization: A Mildly Expan-
sionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 375
(1980).
" Justice Douglas, in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964), held that in a regulated industry where entry is limited both by the re-
quirement of commission approval and the capital expense of facilities, "competi-
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exemption, a singularly rigorous enforcement of the law's policy to pro-
mote competition should ensue.161
The critical questions remaining for this analysis are:
(1) Was the refusal to sell inspired by an intent to monopolize?
(2) Could the sought-for sale of power be accomplished without
materially affecting any of CEI's obligations?
(3) Did CEI understand the consequences to MUNY Light of its
refusal to sell power?
If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative, then a jury
may properly find that CEI's refusal to sell its power to MUNY Light
was unreasonable. On the contrary, only if CEI can establish that its
refusal was based on sound business concerns about either technological
interference with its operations or a potential inability to meet other
commitments if it sold to MUNY Light, can CEI then claim that its
refusal to sell was reasonable. These are issues of fact for jury deter-
mination.
tion then is for the new increments of demand that may emerge with an expand-
ing population and with an expanding industrial or household use of gas." Id at
660. In this context, the elimination of competition was more to be feared than in
a "field where merchants are in a continuous daily struggle to hold old customers
and to win new ones over from their rivals." Id. Accord, Northern Natural Gas
Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 339 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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At the close of trial, Judge Krupansky charged the jury to answer
five Special Interrogatories:
1. What do you find to be the relevant geographic market for retail
firm power?
2. Did CEI monopolize or attempt to monopolize the relevant market?
3. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 2 is "Yes," did CEIs conduct
proximately cause damage to the business or property of the City
of Cleveland?
4A. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 3 is "Yes," is the relevant
market in this case a "natural monopoly" market?
4B. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 4(A) is "Yes," did CEI
monopolize or attempt to monopolize the relevant market by unfair
or predatory means?
5. If the answer to Interrogatory No. 2 is "Yes," and if the answer to
Interrogatory No. 3 is "Yes," and if the answer to Interrogatory
No. 4(A) is "No," or if the answer to Interrogatory No. 4(B) is
"Yes," then a verdict in favor of the plaintiff should be returned,
and the jury should decide the amount of damages sustained by the
City as a result of CEI's refusal to interconnect, CEI's refusal to
wheel PANSY power, and CEI's free wiring program.16
In July, 1981, the jury, after lengthy deliberations, reported to the
Judge that they were unable to reach a unanimous decision. Five jurors
found that CEI had violated the antitrust laws, but one juror adamantly
refused to so find. The case was re-tried, and in October, 1981, a second
jury unanimously answered Special Interragatory No. 2 in the negative;
as a consequence of this finding in CEI's favor, the remaining issues, in-
cluding the natural monopoly defense, were not reached.'
166 Special Verdict Form, Cleveland v. CEI, No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio, filed July
1, 1975).
167 Id.
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